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Abstract
Within the context of the current political discussion over base realignments and 
closures (BRACs) in Germany, this study provides policy guidance by examining the 
economic consequences to the surrounding community. We identify the causal eﬀ  ect 
of a reduction in military personnel on a number of socioeconomic indicators within 
the peripheries of military bases. The BRACs within the German armed forces is used 
an exogenous source of variation that allows for the estimation of the causal eﬀ  ect 
of a particular demand shock on household income, output, unemployment, and tax 
revenue within a speciﬁ  ed buﬀ  er zone around each base. The analysis covers 298 
communities for the period 2003–2007. Consistent with evidence found elsewhere, we 
ﬁ  nd that these base adjustments have only a marginal impact on the local community 
in which the bases are located.
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The changing geopolitical constellation at the end of the Cold War and the increasing
threatfrominternationalterroristorganizationsnecessitatedthere-evaluationofmany
countries’ national defense strategy. For many of the prominent military powers, the
threat of a border invasion has been replaced by threats from overseas for which the
Cold War-era deployment strategies are ill-suited. In recent years, the emphasis has
shifted away from large bases within a country towards small and mobile strike forces
capable of conducting “expeditionary warfare”, i.e., the ability to maintain a theater of
military operations abroad, either for peacekeeping purposes or otherwise. This was
one of the explicit objectives of the reform of the armed forces in countries such as the
UK, France, and Germany.
As a result of the change in the nature of the threat to domestic security as well
as ﬁscal considerations, massive realignments of military personnel and comprehen-
sive programs of base closures and conversions or reuse were implemented in many
countries. Up until the First Persian Gulf War in 1991, US budgetary allocations for
defense and military spending was shrinking as a share of the total budget. Sweden
experienced a substantial reduction in the size of its armed forces during the 1990s,
with many of its bases shut down. Canadian Forces dropped from around 90,000 in
the 1980s to its current level of around 65,000. In 1993, the UK had 274,800 active per-
sonnel; by 2006, it was down to 195,900. France and Germany are in the process of
shutting down redundant bases. The drawdown in military personnel and the closure
of non-essential military bases are occurring in many other countries as well.
These developments are a concern of public policy to the extent that these bases
may positively contribute to the local economy in which they are situated. While
bases are typically founded on strategic motives, civilian economic activity has never-
theless tended to ﬂourish in its periphery [Andersson, Lundberg and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 2007].
For example, the maintenance of the military base is associated with at least some
demand for local goods. Bases also contribute to tax-revenue generation within lo-
cal communities. As Hooker and Knetter [2001] point out, the presence of a military
base contributes directly to military and civilian employment in the area, the latter
through support jobs catering to the maintenance and operation of a military base.
In base locations that are somewhat isolated, the base may be the only major source
of employment [Andersson, Lundberg and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 2007]. The base also necessitates
an improvement in the surrounding infrastructure for the obvious purpose of acces-
sibility. In countries with compulsory military service, such as in Germany, which
we examine here, draftees often travel to and from the base on weekends. A closure
would naturally affect the local and regional transportation infratructure. In practical
terms, the base could be considered as a form of regional subsidy from the federal
government to the local community. A base closure may therefore be construed as a
negative demand shock, which could ultimately translate to a worsening of socioe-
conomic indicators, such as household income, regional output, and unemployment.
4The magnitude of such an effect, of course, depends on many factors, not the least of
which is the degree of integration of the base with the local economy.
There are both direct and indirect effects induced by a base closure. The obvious
direct effect is the immediate loss of employment for those who work on or in support
of the military base. The (off-base) indirect effects include “altered patterns of industry
and worker expenditures on local inputs and outputs” [Poppert and Herzog Jr. 2003].
Local governments also respond to the base closure by converting and re-using the
base for civilian purposes. This poses some difﬁculties for bases that were set up in
regions that are sparsely populated and isolated. In the US, for example, a base in the
middle of the desert may not be easily converted for civilian use [Brauer and Marlin
1992]. Note further that a subsidy artiﬁcially changes the relative prices of inputs
(and, by implication, outputs) in a regional economy. Labor, for example, is cheaper
when using conscripts as opposed to relying on volunteers. A base closure could
therefore result in a reallocation of resources to more productive uses, which could
have a positive effect on some economic outcomes.
A few case studies look at the impact of base closures in the US (e.g., Dardia et al.
[1996], Hill [2000], Soden, Schauer and Conary [2005], and Thanner and Segal [2008]).
While informative and quite important in their own right, evidence obtained from
this line of research can hardly be generalizable by design. An indication of this is
the varied conclusions that these studies have reached. While a few found substan-
tial negative impacts of the base closures, others have indicated that the local com-
munities have been quick to adapt to the change in economic landscape. That there
are varying impacts imply that we cannot simply set aside these case studies for lack
of generalizability. On the other hand, econometrics-based research such as Krizan
[1998], Hooker and Knetter [2001], and Poppert and Herzog Jr. [2003] for the US and
Andersson, Lundberg and Sj¨ ostr¨ om [2007] for Sweden have been quite unambiguous
in their ﬁndings: that the base closures had either no signiﬁcant regional impact or a
small impact that quickly vanishes over time.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the causal impact of base re-
alignments and closures (BRACs) in Germany. We do so in at least three important
ways. First, while studies for the US are numerous, it is not straightforward that the
ﬁndings across the Atlantic will necessarily apply in Germany, where military deploy-
ment is characteristically different from its American counterpart (e.g., German mili-
tary installations are substantially smaller than bases in the US or American bases in
Germany). Second, the implementation of BRACs in Germany is programmed to span
2003–2011, and now is a good opportunity to provide an interim evaluation of the im-
pact of such a program. Third, many other countries are going through a phase of
BRACs or at least are considering it. The results obtained in this study can be useful in
guiding policymakers in those countries for which the economy and original military
deployment is similar to that of Germany. It could also be useful for those countries
intending to follow the German model of military deployment.
5We also improve on the previous studies in a number of ways. First, the process of
BRACs in Germany is less politicized than in the US, from where most of the existing
studies originate. The study therefore does not suffer from the typical endogeneity
bias that would have otherwise prevailed had the BRACs been associated with un-
observable variables that are also correlated with our explanatory variables. For ex-
ample, the degree of political resistance to a closure decision might be related to the
economicsituationinaparticulararea. Adepressedareathatreliessolelyonamilitary
base for employment and income might offer stiff resistance to any planned closure of
a base. If some planned closures were not carried out because of the potential political
fallout, this would make getting an unbiased estimate of the effect of base closures
extremely difﬁcult if not impossible given the available data.
The US program for BRACs was controversial and mired with political overtones.
Therefore, authors looking at the effects of the military drawdown in the US must
contend with the fact that the sample of bases that were closed is selected [Hooker and
Knetter 2001]: perhaps those bases that were successfully closed belong precisely to
those communities that could quickly adapt to such a change in the local political and
economic landscape. Conversely, those communities that could potentially suffer the
most from a base closure mounted a successful opposition against a threat of closure.
In Germany, the BRAC program was met with little or no resistance. The decision
on which bases to close or shrink was entirely based on military considerations as
opposed to socioeconomic ones. As a result, most base closures and reductions went
as scheduled.
Another improvement is that we derive our results by estimating our econometric
models based on buffer zones around the bases generated by geographic information
system (GIS) software. This overcomes the problems related to the arbitrariness of
politically delineated territories. For example, the closure of a base located at the bor-
der of a particular municipality cannot be expected to have the same impact 30 km
away on the opposite side of the same municipality as its impact on a neighboring
municipality 5 km away.
Overall, the results indicate that the military drawdown in Germany, as captured
by the BRAC program adopted by the Ministry of Defense, has had no signiﬁcant
impact on the economic development of the communities around the base as mea-
sured by household income, regional output, the unemployment rate, and revenues
from the value-added tax (VAT) and income tax. This provides a useful insight for
policymakers considering a future reduction of military forces. The so-called “peace
dividend”—the economic beneﬁts arising from times of peace—may be usefully spent
elsewhere rather than ameliorating the non-existent negative impacts of base closures.
62 The Federal Armed Forces of Germany
The Cold War facilitated the entry of what was then West Germany into the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which allowed the Federal Republic to rearm it-
self after World War II. At the height of the Cold War, West Germany’s Federal Armed
Forces (Bundeswehr) had 495,000 military and 170,000 civilian personnel. The Bun-
deswehr is similar to most other armed forces around the world. Its strike forces con-
sists of ﬁve branches: Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Support Service, and Central Med-
ical Service.1 Excluding the reinforcement reserves, it has a current strength of about
258,000 military personnel, of which 200,500 are professional soldiers, 55,000 are con-
scripts, and 2,500 are active reservists. Those who are not on foreign missions are
distributed domestically to about 500 active military bases located all over Germany.
The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the increasing involve-
ment of Germany in other multinational missions (notably for the United Nations)
prompted a reconsideration of the deployment of military personnel. In response to
the new defense landscape, as well as the desire to reduce defense expenditures, Ger-
many recently embarked on a rationalization plan for the Bundeswehr. In 2001, the Fed-
eralMinistryofDefenseadoptedtheDepartmentalDeploymentConcept(Ressortkonzept
Stationierung), which outlined these changes. This included an 18-percent drawdown
of core military personnel from 353,577 to 290,175 and a closure of 187 bases from 575
to 388. This also included a shrinkage of 177 bases, though 90 bases had a planned
increase in personnel. These changes are to be implemented in the period 2003–2011.
In a related development, the new Defense Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspoli-
tische Richtlinien) adopted by the German Parliament in 2003 changed the primary
tasks of the Bundeswehr into international conﬂict prevention and crisis management.
In practical terms, the Bundeswehr was transformed from being a territorial defense
force into a rapidly and internationally deployable intervention force.2 The rise of
international terrorist organizations and greater integration in Europe have made an
invasion of Germany by its neighbors an unlikely event. Instead, Germany faces mili-
tary commitments from as far away as Afghanistan, where it is part of the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established by the United Nations Se-
curity Council. Germany is the third-largest contributor of military personnel to the
ISAF, next to the US and the UK. Aside from the ISAF, it has active participation in
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sudan. Sea-based missions include those over
the Indian Ocean (Horn of Africa) and at the coast of Lebanon.
1In German, Heer, Marine, Luftwaffe, Streitkr¨ aftebasis, and Zentraler Sanit¨ atsdienst, respectively. Other
components of the Bundeswehr include Territoriale Wehrverwaltung, R¨ ustungsbereich, Rechtspﬂege, and
Milit¨ arseelsorge. However, these branches have a civilian scope.
2“Defense starts at the Hindu Kush” (“Verteidigung beginnt am Hindukusch”), Peter Struck, Federal
Ministry of Defense, May 21, 2003. The former minister of defense also says, “[The idea] that our
country needs to be defended against an attack from the air, [or against] a ground attack across our
borders—this scenario is not realistic anymore. The Bundeswehr must come to terms with that. The
Bundeswehr will take on new tasks. Its job will be redeﬁned.” [Radio Free Europe 23 May 2003]
73 Data description
The socioeconomic variables are drawn from the federal and state statistical ofﬁces of
Germany [Statistische ¨ Amter des Bundes und der L¨ ander 2008]. The data are recorded
at the NUTS 3 level (Kreise and kreisfreie St¨ adte, an administrative zone having an av-
erage size of 814 sq. km. As of 2007, there are a total of 429 Kreise in Germany. The
data on military bases, closures, and core personnel were taken from the Deployment
Concept of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany 2004 (Stationierungskonzept der Bun-
deswehr 2004) [Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2004]. This includes a variable
that spatially situates the base at the Gemeinde level (LAU 2, formerly NUTS 5), a sub-
unit of the Kreis whose average size is 65 sq. km. The boundaries of the Kreise and
Gemeinde do not cross so that each Gemeinde is associated with a single Kreis.
The spatial information contained in the data raises several possibilities for link-
ing the socioeconomic measures with military variables. The most direct linkage is to
assign each military base the socioeconomic information of the Kreis in which it is sit-
uated. However, this approach is deemed problematic because it takes no account of
conditions in neighboring Kreise. To the extent that these conditions vary from those of
the Kreis containing the military base, important information may be lost. This prob-
lem may be particularly acute for cases in which a base is in a Gemeinde that directly
shares a border with a neighboring Kreis. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 1,
where the Gemeinde, indicated by the crosshatch pattern, is located along the southern
boundary of its Kreis, indicated in gray. Two other Kreise are located directly to the
south and south east.
[FIGURE 1]
To incorporate the information from the home and surrounding Kreise, we use a
Geographic Information System (GIS) to draw a circular buffer around the centroid of
theselectedGemeinde. Theareaofthebuffer’soverlapwitheachoftheKreisecontained
therein is calculated and then divided by the total area of the buffer. This quotient is
used to construct a weighted sum of the information in each of the surrounding Kreise
for the variables used in the analysis. This approach is similar to Banzhaf and Walsh
[2008], where the authors try to overcome the same difﬁculties encountered here but
with US census data. For example, taking the unemployment rate, the calculation for
Figure 1 would draw on three weights corresponding to the overlap of each of the













where the subscripts i and j denote the Kreis and buffer zone, respectively. Note that
the weights, given by the ﬁrst term in parentheses, sum up to 1. This calculation
applies to just about all military bases in the dataset, i.e., most buffer zones cover more
than one Kreis. One advantage of this approach is that, by adjusting the size of the
8buffer, it allows us to readily test the robustness of the results according to the scale of
the analysis. We set the radius of the buffer at 12 km, which is the average commuting
distance in Germany, and at 20 km to validate the robustness of the estimates. We
also estimate the models using the untransformed data. That is, we use the politically-
delineated district (at the Kreis level) the base is in as the unit of analysis instead of the
local community surrounding the base. One reason why this approach is relevant is
that the creation of the buffer zones disregards natural borders between Kreise, such as
rivers and mountains.
Table 1 presents the number of bases in each Federal State. Overall, the dataset
records 105 base closures out of 298 bases. The majority of the closures occurred in
2007, when 43 bases were completely shut down. The states of Bayern and Rheinland-
Pfalz closed the most number of bases (17), followed closely by Nordrhein-Westfalen
(16), Schleswig Holstein (14), and Niedersachsen (11).
[TABLE 1]
In Table 2, the top 10 Gemeinden in terms of the number of military personnel
in 2003 are shown. In the dataset, the largest base, which is located in Koblenz in
Rheinland-Pfalz, has a personnel complement of 8,830. D¨ usseldorf in Nordrhein-
Westfalen comes next at 3,020 military personnel, which is quite a big difference com-
pared to the base in Koblenz. Of the top 10 bases, two were eventually closed by 2007
(Memmingerberg in Bayern and Kappeln in Schleswig-Holstein) while another two
experienced merely a reduction (Hammelburg in Bayern and Sigmaringen in Baden-
W¨ urttemberg). Table 2 illustrates further that the personnel complement in each base
is not a substantial part of the population, except the base in Koblenz, where the share
approaches 10 percent. Typically, the range is between 1 to 2 percent.
[TABLE 2]
Togetanindicationofthedifferencesbetweenzoneswherebaseseventuallyclosed
and zones where there were merely reductions in military personnel (in the dataset,
all military bases experienced at least a reduction in military personnel), we test the
equality of means of various indicators between the two groups using the ﬁrst and last
year they are observed in the dataset, i.e., 2003 and 2007. The results of the tests are
presented in Table 3. For all cases, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference between the two
groups for both years. The test results from 2003 indicate that these two groups are
comparable with each other, which minimizes the possibility of an omitted variable
biasing our results, while the 2007 results give a preview of the conclusions obtained
from regressions described in the subsequent section. The idea is that, in recovering
the effect of a base closure on a particular outcome variable of interest from observa-
tional data, one must compare the outcome for a community around a base that closed
to what would have happened had that particular base not closed—the counterfactual.
Sincethecounterfactualisneverobserved, werelyonothercommunitiesaroundbases
that did not close to serve as a control group, with which we can compare the outcome
for the treated units (where bases did in fact close). These control units should ideally
9be similar in observed and unobserved characteristics to the treated units before the
treatment occurred. That these units are similar in observed characteristics, as demon-
strated by the equality-of-means tests, makes it much more likely that they are also
similar in unobserved characteristics. Naturally, since the discussion is about the un-
observed, one can never be entirely certain, but this applies just as well to all studies
that use observational data.
[TABLE 3]
4 Estimation strategy and results
A least-squares regression is used to estimate the impact of the number of military
personnel on the outcome variable of interest within the periphery of the base. This
framework is expressed in the following econometric speciﬁcation:
yit = α + δDPi, t−1 + β xit + θ zt + eit, (1)
where yit is a particular socioeconomic indicator for buffer i in year t, DPi, t−1 is the
number of military personnel (Dienstposten) in buffer i in the previous period (rescaled
by dividing by 10,000), xit is a vector of control variables, zt is a vector of buffer-
invariant year ﬁxed effects, and eit is a random error; α, δ, β, and θ are a set of param-
eters and parameter vectors to be estimated. The estimate of δ represents the causal
effect of base realignments and closures (as measured by the once-lagged number of
military personnel) on the outcome variable.
We estimate the model in a partial-equilibrium context for the following outcome
variables: household income, regional output (GNP), the unemployment rate, and
revenues from VAT and income tax. The annual real household income, real GNP, and
VAT and income-tax revenues are logarithmized so that a 1-unit increase in the in-
dependent variable translates to a δ-percent change in the outcome variable for these
four cases. The set of control variables included in xit are real GNP per capita, dis-
posable income per capita relative to the national mean, population density, the share
of employed people, the share of men who are 15 to 25 years old in the population,
the share of immigrants in the population, and a dummy for buffers located in the
former East Germany. These variables have been used in the literature to control for
other factors that affect regional development other than the presence of a military
base [Andersson, Lundberg and Sj¨ ostr¨ om 2007]. To avoid spurious correlations, the
variables contained in xit change with respect to the outcome variable of interest. For
example, disposable income per capita relative to the national mean is not included in
the regressions for annual real income but are included in the other regressions.
While the possibility of omitted-variable bias can never be completely ruled out,
we ascribe a causal interpretation to the estimated coefﬁcient  δ that is free of biases
10otherwise emerging from the correlation of DPi, t−1 with the error term in Equation (1).
This is because the decision to realign the base personnel is based on strategic military
considerations that are unrelated to the local socioeconomic dynamics that govern the
community around the base. As Brauer and Marlin [1992] point out in their survey of
the studies in the US, “communities, ﬁrms, and labor seldom set about reducing their
military dependence in the absence of actual or imminent military cuts. Conversion is
usually ‘forced from above’ by the cuts and the affected actors apply little forethought
in anticipating changes in military orders.”3 The same is true for Germany, where
closures were met with little or no resistance. Nevertheless, the variable enters the
equation once-lagged since the likely effect of the personnel changes does not materi-
alize instantaneously. As a matter of inference over the parameter estimates, we allow
for an arbitrary covariance structure within each buffer through time by reporting
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the buffer level.
The above discussion nevertheless does not rule out the possibility that there are
characteristics speciﬁc to an economic community that both could affect the outcome
variablesofinterestandaresimultaneouslyunobservedatleastbytheeconometrician.
Therefore, to check the robustness of our results, we include buffer-speciﬁc character-
istics that could possibly be correlated with the regressors by augmenting Equation (1)
with a time-invariant linear ﬁxed effect φi, which may or may not be orthogonal to the
disturbance term eit:
yit = α + δDPi, t−1 + β xit + θ zt + φi + eit. (2)
The model is then estimated as a standard ﬁxed-effects regression model.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the regression results following OLS and FE estimates of
Equations 1 and 2, respectively. Based on the OLS regressions, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
impact of base closures on the local economy. The same result is observed for the FE
regressions, except for the model of real income tax and real value-added tax for the
12-km buffer and the untransformed data, respectively. Both are signiﬁcant at the 10-
percent level. A 10,000-person increase in military personnel depresses real income
tax by about 12 percent within a 355-sq. km. area around a base. The same increase
would lead to a decline in VAT collection of about 4 percent using the untransformed
data. While this results are at ﬁrst blush counterintuitive, it may reﬂect the possibility
that military bases deﬂect resources from other more productive activities. That is, the
extant resource allocation in the regional economy is suboptimal and the closure of the
military base pushes capital and labor towards more productive uses. Taken together,
these results thus suggest that base closures have a negligible impact on economic
activity.4
3In fact, “[m]ost communities affected by forced converstion, especially those particularly depen-
dent on the military dollar, react in a surprised and helpless manner, often simply swallowing the job
loss when the cuts arrive.” [Brauer and Marlin 1992] This phenomenon, while indicating that local gov-
ernments seem oblivious to the dynamics of regional development, helps in exogenizing our primary
variable of interest.
4One limitation of the dataset is that we cannot identify in which month a particular base closed
11[TABLES 4, 5, 6]
5 Conclusion
The base realignments and closures in Germany and in many other countries high-
light the important issue of whether such rationalization programs have an impact on
local communities. Throughout its lifespan, a base may integrate itself into the com-
munity in which it is located. Such a base contributes to the community’s stability and
economic development so that when closed, it can severely impact an area’s economy.
Based on case studies in the US, this has indeed happened. It therefore raises a num-
ber of relevant questions for public policy. For example, what type of bases can be
closed with the least negative impact to the community (and how should it be closed
and possibly converted for civilian purposes)? Should policy instruments be used to
compensate for the effects of any closure? How quickly does the community adjust
to such an exogenous shock? Answers to these and other similar questions can guide
policymakers in countries attempting to reconﬁgure their armed forces.
We ﬁnd that in Germany, base closures hardly made a dent on the local economy.
Base closures that happened as part of the modernization of the German armed forces
beginning in 2003 have had no signiﬁcant socioeconomic impact on its surrounding
community. A few notable features of German military bases contribute to this result.
Not the least of these reasons is the fact that German bases are much smaller compared
to, say, American bases both in the US and in Germany. In case studies looking at the
impact of base closures in the US, those that have had a substantial impact typically
involve a closure of a large base. In contrast, the largest base that closed in our dataset
is located in Memmingerberg in the county of Unterallg¨ au, Bayern. At the start of the
period of analysis, the Memmingerberg base had a personnel complement of 2,036,
which represents 1.5 percent of the population.
Another plausible reason why we ﬁnd no effect is that most German bases are self-
sufﬁcient and autonomous. These bases and the personnel living in them are not as
integrated into the local community as perhaps other bases (e.g., in the United States).
Since 2002, provisions for German military bases have been administered centrally
through the Verpﬂegungsamt (Provisions Ofﬁce) in Oldenburg, Niedersachsen. Al-
though for obvious reasons fresh produce are sourced locally, goods with a long shelf
life are typically procured through the Verpﬂegungsamt. Major construction works and
the fundamental infrastructure of German bases are also centrally managed through
or how long the process took for the base to completely shut down. For example, the effects of a base
closure in December 2005 might materialize not in 2006 but rather in 2007. To address this issue, we
performed the same econometric exercise described above except that we used DPi, t and DPi, t−2 in
separate regressions instead of DPi, t−1, i.e., the variable of interest is used contemporaneously and
as well as lagged twice. We ﬁnd that this does not alter our results in any meaningful way. These
supplemental estimations are available upon request.
12the Territoriale Wehrverwaltung.5
Beyond that, closed bases are also rapidly reused for civilian purposes in Germany.
One base (L¨ uttichkaserne, Hessen) is being transformed into a historic train ride; an-
other (Ledebur-Kaserne in Niedersachsen) will be converted into a hospital complex
with a planned investment of e80 million; and yet another (Marinest¨ utzpunkt Olpen-
pitzinSchleswig-Holstein)isbeingmarketedasamajortouristattractioncalled“Hafencity”
complete with a yacht club (and a planned investment of e500 million).6 In the con-
version and reuse of these bases, new employment is generated and those who lost
their jobs may be re-employed, which mitigates the negative impacts of base closures.
These new (civilian) development projects presumably also induce a substantial in-
crease in tax revenue as reﬂected by the estimates presented above.
Given that defense and military strategies are permanently in ﬂux in a rapidly
changing geopolitical conﬁguration, some countries might ﬁnd it advantageous to re-
think their current deployment strategies to take into consideration the effects of a
possible drawdown of military strength in the future or indeed also a possible escala-
tion of defensive forces in response to new and resurrected threats. Germany provides
a valuable lesson in this regard. The deployment strategy of the Bundeswehr seems
especially suited for upscaling and downscaling military bases without damaging the
surrounding communities. This ﬂexibility is conducive to economic growth and ulti-
mately contributes to the country’s security.
***
5See the website of the Territoriale Wehrverwaltung for details (in German).
6These and other examples are from the Bundesanstalt f¨ ur Immobilienaufgaben, “Verfahren zur Verwer-
tung bundeseigener Liegenschaften”, 1 April 2008.
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14Figures
FIGURE 1—GIS-BASED CALCULATION OF THE VARIABLES
Note: This base is located in Hammelburg, Bad Kissingen in the state of Bayern.
15Tables
TABLE 1—T IMELINE OF BASE CLOSURES BY FEDERAL STATE
Federal State Bases
Number of base closures by year
Bases closed
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Bayern 50 02276 1 7
Nordrhein-Westfalen 43 01663 1 6
Schleswig Holstein 39 03425 1 4
Rheinland-Pfalz 36 00197 1 7
Niedersachsen 35 00326 1 1
Baden-W¨ urttemberg 29 00035 8
Hessen 23 02124 9
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 19 01004 5
Brandenburg 13 02110 4
Th¨ uringen 6 00002 2
Saarland 4 00100 1
Sachsen 1 00001 1
Total 298 0 11 19 32 43 105
SOURCE: Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004.




2003 2007 2003 2007
Koblenz Koblenz 8,830 8,830 0.0819 0.0832
D¨ usseldorf D¨ usseldorf 3,020 3,020 0.0053 0.0052
Hammelburg Bad Kissingen 2,490 1,830 0.0228 0.0172
Penzing Landsberg am Lech 2,360 2,360 0.0215 0.0208
Sigmaringen Sigmaringen 2,200 1,670 0.0164 0.0126
Strausberg M¨ arkisch-Oderland 2,200 2,200 0.0115 0.0115
Regensburg Regensburg 2,140 2,140 0.0167 0.0162
Stetten am kalten Markt Sigmaringen 2,080 2,080 0.0155 0.0157
Memmingerberg Unterallg¨ au 2,036 0 0.0150 0.0000
Kappeln Schleswig-Flensburg 1,950 0 0.0098 0.0000
SOURCE: Stationierungskonzept der Bundeswehr 2004.
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